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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PARLEY MORTENSON, and
EDITH MORTENSON, his wife,
ROY MORTENSON and VERA
MORTENSON, his wife
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

FINANCIAL GROWTH INC.,
PROFESSIONAL UNITED REALTY ,
FLOYD E. BENTON and
GLEN R. MILNER,

Case No.
11343

Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action wherein the Plaintiffs claim the Defendant, Financial Growth, Inc., materially and totally
breached an agreement dated August 25, 1967, for the sale
of real property by Plaintiffs to Defendant, Financial
Growth, Inc., and wherein Plaintiffs by reason of said
alleged breach claim an absolute right to terminate said
agreement. Defendant, Professional United Realty, is a
licensed real estate company who by counterclaim seeks
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to recover from Plaintiffs a real estate commission in the
amount of $28,265.00 earned in connection with the sale of
the aforesaid property.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was argued before the Honorable Stewart M.
Hanson on the law and Motion Calendar on Plaintiffs' Motion for a Summary Judgment declaring a breach of contract by Defendant, Financial Growth, Inc., and the right
by Plaintiffs to terminate said contract and for Judgment
of Dismissal of Defendants' Counterclaim. After a brief
hearing and argument the Lower Court granted Plaintiffs
their Motion for Summary Judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants and Appellants seek a reversal of the Lower Court's Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and for an Order directing the Lower Court to
afford Defendants the opportunity for a trial as to all issues
of fact.

STA TEMENT OF FACTS
Professional United Realty, one of the Defendants, is a
corporation engaged in the sale of real estate within the
State of Utah. Said Corporation is fully qualified. Floyd E.
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Benton is an officer of Professional United Realty and is
employed by said real estate company as a real estate salesman. Glen R. Milner is the broker for said real estate company. On the 26th day of February, 1966, Parley Mortenson,
one of the Plaintiffs above, caused to be executed a farm
listing agreement and a sales agency contract involving the
real property, subject of this proceeding. In so doing he
acted on behalf of a partnership entity consisting of the
Plaintiffs herein. A photocopy of the farm listing agreement
is filed herein as a part of Defendants' Counterclaim, (R.46).
Within the term of said agreement and on the 25th day of
April, 1966, Defendant, Professional United Realty by and
through the efforts of Floyd E. Benton and Glen R. Milner,
presented an offer to Plaintiffs, meeting all of the requirements of the listing agreement aforesaid for the purchase
of the property, subject of this legal action. The prospective
buyer was Beehive Development Company. Beehive Development Company was then ready, willing and able to
perform according to the terms of the offer (R. 47). Said
sale was not consummated through no fault of Defendants.
Subsequently, Defendants, Professional United Realty by
and through the efforts of Floyd E. Benton and Glen R.
Milner, obtained a second offer to purchase the subject
property. Said offer originated from Financial Growth,
Inc., the other Defendant herein named. Financial Growth,
Inc., was ready, willing, and able to perform according to
the terms of said agreement at the time said offer was made
and is now ready, willing and able to perform according to
the terms of said agreement. After said offer of Financial
Growth, Inc., had been presented to Plaintiffs, said Plaintiffs, through their legal counsel, caused to be drafted a
contract of sale (R. 42). Said contract of sale was signed by
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Mortenson Brothers Company, a partnership, Roy Mortenson, partner; Parley Mortenson, partner; Roy Mortenson,
Vera Mortenson, Parley Mortenson, and Edith Mortenson,
all as Sellers and Financial Growth, Inc., by Douglas L.
Daily, president and Perry Holley, agent and advisor, attested by Drew D. Kay, assistant secretary, as Buyers.
Professional United Realty, Floyd E. Benton and Glen R.
Milner were not parties to this agreement. At the time of
execution of the agreement August 25" 1967, and pursuant
to the terms thereof (R. 6), the sum of $3,000.00 was paid
to the Sellers by Financial Growth, Inc. No part of this
amount has been tendered back to Defendants by Plaintiffs.
After the execution of the aforesaid agreements of sale
a dispute arose between the contracting parties as to the
amount of acreage under consideration wherein the Defendants were informed that a material part of the property,
to-wit: the designated Kippen acquisition (R. 5) was not
then available and was not to be included in the contract of
sale. Further, the Plaintiffs failed and neglected to provide
in a timely fashion as requested by Defendants, evidence of
title to the property as was called for in the agreement
(R. 15), and subsequently, when such evidence was provided (title insurance binder was finally furnished after
December 20, 1967), it was made clearly apparent to the
Defendants that there were material reservations of mineral rights which rendered a conveyance of the fee simple
title impossible of performance by Plaintiffs. Defendants
requested Plaintiffs to take immediate steps to obtain the
mineral rights in order to facilitate financing of the entire
contract as contemplated by the parties at the time of its
inception. Plaintiffs failed and refused to comply with the
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request of the Defendants and informed the Defendants
that it would be impossible for Plaintiffs to obtain such
mineral rights. Plaintiffs thereafter were informed by the
Defendants that the Defendants stood ready to perform
according to the tenor of the agreement at such time as
Plaintiffs were able to cure the defect in the title.
The Plaintiffs in arr apparent effort to remove any
cloud that might exist by reason of the agreement to sell
brought the action herein to establish a breach of the sales
agreement by the purchasing Defendant, Financial Growth,
Inc., and to gain a determination of the court of Plaintiffs'
right to terminate said agreement. Because Plaintiffs elected to name Professional United Realty, Floyd E. Benton
and Glen R. Milner as Defendants herein, said Defendants'
Counterclaim was filed in this proceeding. After a very
brief hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment,
the Lower Court granted the same.

ARGUMENT

POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS ON
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AND OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL ON DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM WITHOUT AFFORDING DEFENDANTS A
TRIAL ON THE ISSUES OF FACT RAISED BY THE
PLEADINGS.

6

It is a fundamental rule of practice based upon sound

legal principles that a Motion for Summary Judgment cannot be granted where there are bona fide issues of material
facts to be determined. Such determination is the prerogative of the trial court.
In the sales agreement upon which Plaintiffs' Complaint is based at (R. 11 and 12) Plaintiffs bind themselves
to convey to the purchaser the fee simple title to said property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances except
as stated in the agreement. Plaintiffs allege in1 Paragraph 4
of their Complaint (R 2) that they have good and sufficient
title. Defendants, by way of answer (R 43) expressly deny
that Plaintiffs have good and sufficient title to the property.
Hence, we have issue of fact Number 1.
There was not before the court any testimony or other
evidence of title to resolve this issue of fact. Argument was
made that the absence of mineral rights did not substantially impair the title as to excuse Defendants from prompt
performance of their obligations. Appellants contend that
absence of such mineral rights in the face of a contract to
convey a fee simple title, and coupled with a demonstrated
inability on the part of Plaintiffs to acquire such title even
at a subsequent period, validly excused the Defendants
from payment and in fact gave rise to an action for damages by the Defendants against the Plaintiffs.
In 102 ALR 1082, the annotation on this subject, it
states at Page 1083 "The majority rule is that where the
vendor in an executory contract for the sale of land declares

,..,
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positively, prior to the time set for performance on his part,
that he will not perform the contract at all, the vendee may,
if he so elects, treat the contract as immediatelv breached
in omnibus, and thereupon maintain an action for damages."
At a proper trial of this case, Defendants were prepared to offer evidence that the basis of their contract of
purchase was in obtaining clear, unencumbered title, including mineral rights, for the financial backers and Defendants were interested in the land for oil and gas
exploration. That before the first installment payment was
due on December 1, 1967, Defendants had many times requested a title insurance binder from Plaintiffs or the abstracts brought to date. Finally Plaintiffs secured a title
insurance binder dated December 20, 1967, but did not send
the same to Defendants until January 12, 1968. When the
Defendants learned thereby that a large number of acres in
the deal were subject to mineral rights being reserved it
had a great bearing on their financial program. Therefore
Defendants made demand upon Plaintiffs to insure them
that this defect could be cured some way, but Plaintiffs
replied that it would not be possible to do so.
All these evidentiary matters, therefore, should have
been presented to a trial court so that a proper determination could be had on' whether or not there was in fact a
breach of a contract, and if so, who breached the same, and
what damages, if any, may have resulted.
Plaintiffs plead certain costs and disbursements in connection with this matter. Defendants deny the same. There
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POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
In Plaintiffs' Motion they asked the Court not only for
Summary Judgment on their complaint for breach of contract and the right to terminate the agreement, but also for
Summary Judgment dismissing Defendants' Counterclaim.
We do not believe the lower court gave proper consideration to either the facts involved or the law surrounding
these phases of Plaintiffs' Motion.
It is not clear upon what ground(s) the court granted

Plaintiffs' Motion, for there are no findings and no other
comment by the court. However, if we assume the court
concluded that Defendant, Financial Growth, Inc., was in
default on the contract of August 25, 1967, and thus allowed
Plaintiffs to terminate the same, we believe the court erred
in its conclusion.
In the first place, Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint
a failure by Defendants to make an installment payment on
December 1, 1967, and a total breach of the agreement
(R 2). Defendants, on the other hand, denied this allegation
or that there was such breach (R 43, 45). No testimony was
taken on this material issue of fact, and the court should
have allowed a hearing to actually determine if there
was in fact a breach of the contract, and if so, who breached
it. It is Defendants' contention that if there was a breach
of the contract at this point it was breached by the Plaintiffs.
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Now the agreement clearly provided that Seller,
(Plaintiffs), would furnish evidence of clear title (R 12, 15).
It is obvious that Defendants (Purchasers) weren't about
to pay out almost $153,000.00 until they knew about the
title to the property. This is the usual and customary procedure in this type of transaction. Thus when no evidence
of title was furnished by December 1, 1967, the date of the
large installment, we submit that as a matter of law no
breach of contract occured on that date by Defendants in
not making that payment. In fact Plaintiffs excused and
waived the payment at least until January 12, 1968, when
they sent the title insurance binder to Defendants. On that
date, because there appeared a material defect in the title
and a dispute arose over the same, we again submit that
Plaintiffs acquiesced in and excused the large installment
payment, to see if the dispute could not be resolved.
Again, even if it should be determined that Plaintiffs
by their actions did not excuse or waive the large installment payment when it became due, we believe the law supports the proposition that Defendants were not required to
perform specifically under the contract where the encumbrance or defect in the title to the property being furnished
could not be removed, or that Plaintiffs refused to do so,
as is our contention here. In 57 ALR 1378, it states:
"It is the well-settled rule that, to comply with a
contract to furnish a good title, the vendor must
furnish a title free from encumbrances. But the failure of the vendor to remove encumbrances up to the
time of the trial does not preclude specific performance, providing he is able to do so at that time.
However, he is not entitled to specific performance
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of a contract for the sale of the W.nd ichere he is unable to show that the encumbrances against the property may be removed at the time of the trial or at
least before final decree."
Also in the same annotation on marketable title, 57
ALR 1520, the question in point, of the "Refusal of Vendor
to undertake to cure defects" is discussed at paragraph 6
as follows:
"Even though the Vendor might be entitled under
some circumstances to additional time in which to
perfect defects in his title, the time in which he is
entitled to furnish a good title ceases when he
wrongfully demands that the vendee accept that
which is not good, and brings an action to enforce a
forfeiture for his failure to do so."
It is Defendants' contention that Plaintiffs refused and
said it was impossible to cure the defect of the mineral reservations on a substantial portion of the land involved.
This, in essence then, became an anticipatory breach of the
agreement by Plaintiffs, that they would never be able to
furnish a clear title. Defendants, therefore, should not be
compelled to pay out over a half million dollars, knowing
that it was impossibe to get clear title to the property. Defendants were entitled to some consideration of diminution
of purchase price, damages or other consideration before
being compelled to pay out their money.

In 55 Am, Jur 726, Section 283, the law seems clear on
this point:
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"Almost all of the cases wherein the point has been
in a~y way touched upon either hold or recognize
that if defects or encumbrances of title are of such a
character that the vendor has neither the title which
he has agreed to convey nor in a practical sense any
prospect of acquiring it-that is, if the vendor probably or presumably will not have the agreed title at
the time set for the conveyance, the defects or encumbrances being probably or presumably not removable-the vendee is not required to continue
with the contract, but may rescind, even though the
time set for conveyance has not arrived."
The case of Garnett v. Macon, 2 Brock 185, 6 Call (Va.)
308, Fed Case No. 5,245, is cited in 57 ALR at page 1513
wherein Justice Marshall states:
"That the vendor who demands performance must
have the capacity to do substantially all that he has
promised before he can entitle himself to the aid of
the court. At what time this capacity must exist,
whether it must be at the date of the contract, at the
time it is to be executed, or at the time of the decree,
depends upon circumstances which may vary with
every case. The inquiry in every case must be
whether the vendor could at the time have conveyed
such a title as the vendee had a right to command;
if he could not then, whether he can now; and, if he
can, whether there has been such a change of circumstances that a Court of equity ought not to compel the vendee to perform."
Again in 57 ALR 1413 at paragraph 10 the annotation
states:
"Reservations of rights or interest in the land incompatible with the full enjoyment and ownership
in fee, free from all encumbrances, render the title
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to the land unmarketable, and relieve a vendee of
the duty of carrying out an executory contract to
purchase the land, where the contract contains no
exceptions as to such reservations."
(See also Culley v. Dixon 199 Iowa 136, 201 N.W.
582 and Innis v. Costello, II Alberta L.R. 109, 33
D.L.R. 602--cited in the notes of 57 ALR at pages
1413 and 1414 in reference to reservation of mineral
rights.)
We submit, therefore, that the lower court should not
have concluded summarily that the Defendants were in default on the contract and that Plaintiffs had a right to terminate the agreement. On the contrary, Defendants have a
right to rescind or to seek damages or to obtain a diminution in the purchase price.
With reference to the second part of Plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment, that of dismissing Defendants'
counterclaim, again we believe the court erred as a matter
of law in granting the same.
The counterclaim of Defendants in this action involves
the payment of a real estate commission.
The court seems to have overlooked this problem, otherwise it must have concluded that Defendant, Professional
United Realty was entitled to a commission, as a matter of
law, if it felt there were no issues of fact to be determined.
The only documents the court had before it were the
sales agency agreement (R 46), where Plaintiffs obligated
themselves to pay a 10% commission to Professional United

15
Realty should they produce a buyer; also an earnest money
receipt and offer to purchase (R 47), where a Buyer was
produced in accordance with the listing agreement; and a
subsequent contract agreement dated August 25, 1967, executed by Buyers and Sellers (R 4-42).
There was no question but that the agreement of
August 25, 1967, to purchase the Plaintiffs' property actually grew out of the previous offer to purchase, Perry Holley
being an interested party with both Beehive Development
Co., the corporation involved on the first offer, and Financial Growth, Inc., the purchaser on the August 25, 1967
agreement. This came about, of course, through the efforts
of Defendant, Professional United Realty.
Someone, therefore, was obligated to pay a commission
to Professional United Realty, for they had produced a
buyer, and $3,000.00 had been paid to and accepted by
sellers.
Inasmuch as neither Professional United Realty nor
its agent, Floyd E. Benton and Glen R. Milner, was a party
to the contract of August 25, 1967, they must look to Plaintiffs for their commission under the previous sales agency
contract, which we submit was actually extended to August 25, 1967, by the acquiescence, intent, and actions of the
Parties, and as actually growing out of the offer to purchase
of Beehive Development Company, Inc.
Plaintiffs may argue that the Buyers, Financial
Growth, Inc., were obligated to pay the commission by
reason of their agreement between themselves (R 10, 11),
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but in view of the fact that Plaintiffs included Professional
United Realty as a Defendant in this law suit, and because
Plaintiffs have determined to terminate the agreement of
August 25, 1967, and in essence rescind the same, they become obligated to repay to the buyer (Financial Growth,
Inc.) what they have paid out on the agreement or are obligated to pay, which included this real estate commission.
In Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment they
merely ask the court for an order declaring the real estate
contract to be breached by Defendant, Financial Growth,
Inc., and that Plaintiffs have a right to terminate said
agreement (R 57). We submit that Plaintiffs have elected
to rescind the agreement. No mention is made of forfeiture
or damages in their motion. Having elected to rescind the
agreement, it renders them liable to account to Defendant,
Financial Growth, Inc., for what they are out, which
amounts to $3,000.00 down payment and $28,265.00 in commissions.
In support of this view we cite the annotation of 59
ALR 215, paragraph 4(a):
"As shown in the foregoing cases, where the vendee
has defaulted in carrying out the provisions of a
contract, the vendor may waive the default, or he
may exercise the right of forfeiture authorized by
the contract; and where the contract contains no
forfeiture provision, he may terminate it if the vendee fails to perform after demand is made and a
reasonable opportunity given. Instead of pursuing
these remedies, however, the vendor may rescind
the contract for the default of the vendee, and, since
rescission of a contract contemplates placing the
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parties in statu quo, according to some of the cases,
the vendor, by rescinding the contract for default of
vendee, renders himself liable to account to the latter for the amount paid on the purchase price, especially where the contract contains no provision making time of the essence thereof and providing for the
forfeiture of payments made by the vendee."
Now the argument made above contemplates that
Plaintiffs had a right to rescind the contract by reason of
the default of Financial Growth, Inc. However, Defendants
contend that there was no breach or default by Financial
Growth, Inc., but the breach or default, if any, was on the
part of Plaintiffs in not being able to cure the title defects,
now or later, and in fact entitled Defendants to claim damages against Plaintiffs, part of which amounts to the sales
commission of $28,365.00. (See the annotation at 102 ALR
1082 previously cited on this point).
Therefore, it appears to counsel for Defendants that
under any of these theories argued herein Defendants are
entitled, as a matter of law, to the amount claimed as real
estate commissions, or in the very least, a further trial court
hearing on these matters.

POINT THREE
IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING PLAINTIFFS TO REFUND TO DEFENDANT
ITS MONEY PAID ON THE LAND.
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Assuming, for the purpose of this argument, that the
Court could properly grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, and in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, it
was still incumbent upon the court to order a refund to the
Defendant, Financial Growth, Inc., by Plaintiffs of the
$3,000.00 down payment.
Now here in the pleadings, and certainly not in Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, was there mention of
Plaintiffs' declaring a forfeiture of the moneys paid in, or
the right to retain the same, on any theory. Plaintiffs merely asked the Court for the right to terminate the contract
(R 57). This amounted to a rescission or repudiation of the
contract by Plaintiffs and obligated them to refund the
down payment. We refer the court to our argument on this
matter in our Point Two.
"Forfeiture and rescission are imcompatible and
will not mix. The concomitant of rescission is restitution, not forfeiture." (See Johnson v. Gilbert, 234
Or. 350; 382 P 2nd 87).
Also in 17 Am Jur 2nd 994, Section 512, it states:
"The very idea of rescinding a contract implies that
what has been parted with shall be restored on both
sides, and hence the general rule which is to be
reasonably applied and is subject to certain exceptions, is that a party who wishes to rescind a contract must place the opposite party in statu quo."
(See also Peterson v. Hodges, 121 Utah 72; 239 P
2nd 180).
Furthermore, it would be most inequitable and unjust
to allow Plaintiffs to terminate the contract and retain the
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$3,000.00 down payment, when Plaintiffs were unable to
perform under the contract, as to title, even if the Court
could properly consider Defendants to be in default on
their installment payment.
Finally, the contract of August 25, 1967, itself would.
at least, require Plaintiffs to make refund of this $3,000.00
(R 12). It states under the paragraph entitled "CURE OF
ENCUMBRANCES AND LIENS" as follows:
"If Seller shall be unable to deliver or cause to be
delivered a deed or deeds conveying the fee simple
title to the property, free of all liens and encumbrances except as herein stated, and if Purchaser shall
not exercise the privilege (which Purchaser shall
have) of waiving the liens and encumbrances which
shall be the basis of such inability and accept the
title in its then condition without diminution of the
purchase price and without claim or demand against
Seller, then the aforesaid payments made by Purchaser to Seller, shall be refunded without interest
to Purchaser . . ."
It is Defendants' contention, however, that they have

other claims or demands against Seller (Plaintiffs), but in
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the least that should
be done by reason of the incurable title defects, is for Plaintiffs to refund Defendant's $3,000.00 down payment, and
the lower court should have so ordered if it was going to
grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
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CONCLUSION
In view of the fact that the pleadings in this case raise
several material issues of fact, and in view of the material
dispute between Plaintiffs and Defendants, as raised by the
pleadings, on whether there was in fact a breach of contract
by Defendants as well as a commission earned by Defendant, Professional United Realty, we respectfully petition
this court to reverse the lower court's order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, so that Defendants
may properly have their day in court.
Further, the lower court should be required to make a
disposition of the $3,000.00 down payment on the contract
as petitioned for in this brief.
Respectfully submitted,
SPAFFORD & YOUNG
Suite 201, Dixon Building
2188 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants

